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Arms Control Procedure:
Inspection by the People - A
Reevaluation and A Proposal
Barry M. PortnoyIn the late 1950's, Seymour Melman and Louis Bohn, working independently, both suggested a plan for arms control inspection which
was rather different from the approaches to verification which had
been discussed until that time.' Essentially, their idea was to have
the people, as individuals, report violations of arms control agreements
by their governments and their neighbors to an international authority.
At the time of its first presentation, this idea caused a considerable stir
among those interested in arms control and disarmament; and various
specific proposals for implementation were advanced. 2 Since then, however, this idea has been almost completely ignored by politicians and
academicians alike.3 In view of the contemporary emphasis on verification procedures at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, a reevaluation
of this proposal may be worthwhile at this time.
I. MECHANICS OF A POPULAR REPORTING SYSTEM

The success of a plan for popular reporting of arms control violations
requires the presence of four factors. First, a sufficient number of people
must be willing to report violations. Second, the people must be able
*This paper was originally prepared for a seminar on the impact of technology on
international arms control, given by the Cornell Program on Science, Technology, and
Society.
1. S. MELMAN, INSPECTION FOR DISARMAMENT 38-44 (1958); Bohn, Non-Physical Inspection Techniques, in ARMIS CONTROL, DISARMAMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 347-53
(D. Brennan ed. 1961).
2. E.g., T. SLICK, PERMANENT PEACE 79-80 (1958); G. CLARK and L. B. SOHN, WORLD
PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW 267 (2d ed. 1960); and L. SZiLARD, THE VOICE OF THE
DOLPHINS 57-59 (1961).
3. In general, arms limitation verification procedures are divided into two categories.
The first is known as "national" or "unilateral" verification techniques which do
not require an agreement for inspection within the boundaries of another nation.
The second category is termed "on-site inspection", in which a nation would agree
to allow nationals of another country to inspect within its territory to determine
if violations had occurred....
Scoville, Verification of Nuclear Arms Limitations: An Analysis, 26 BULL. OF THE
ATo, ic SCIENTISTs 6 (Oct. 1970). See also D. W. WAINHOuSE, ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS: DESIGNS FOR VERIFICATION AND ORGANIZATION (1968). Although this book attempts to examine all verification procedures discussed in disarmament negotiations
since World War II, there is no hint of inspection by the people.
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to report; there must be a readily available and secure means of communication between the people and the authority to which they are to
report. Third, the people must know when violations occur; or, in other
words, it must be likely that a willing member of the public will learn
of a violation and that he will recognize it as such. Fourth, the authority
to which violations are reported must be capable of determining their
4
veracity.
The willingness of the people to report against their own government
will be the most difficult of these factors to establish. It has been suggested
that rewards or the right to resettle in another country might be offered to encourage popular participation in arms control inspection.8
It is difficult to imagine, however, how the rewards might be delivered
or the informer's right to travel protected when opposed by a hostile
government. 6 Similarly, imposing a duty upon the people to report violations by enacting national laws making it a crime not to report 7 probably
would not insure the necessary cooperation. Faced with contradictory
governmental policies, people can be expected to choose a course of
inaction rather than action; and this would be especially so if the violation of the arms control treaty appeared justified by changed circumstances. 8
Perhaps the best insurance of the willingness of people to participate
in arms control inspection would lie in their recognition of the arms
control agreement as beneficial to their national and personal interests.0
Both patriotism and the survival instinct can be used to lead men to
report violations rather than conceal them. For this to happen, the agreement must be beneficial to all the participating governments; and this
fact, in addition to the dangers which flow from evasion of the agreement,
must be pointed out to the people. Mutual advantage to the participating
nations is probably a requirement for the existence of an arms control
agreement not imposed by arms. Generating popular support for the
agreement will require the use of the communications media. It has
been suggested that national leaders undertake to explain the advantages
of the agreement to their people' 0 and that minimum amounts of radio
and television time and newspaper space for the same purpose be made

4. For a similar but not identical list of factors see Galtung, Popular Inspection of
Disarmament Processes, 2 COOPERATION AND CONFLIar 121 (1967).
5. E.g., L. SzvAtD, supra note 2, at 57-58.
6. See, e.g., the discussion of the Soviet policy on emigration in H. J. BERMAN and
P. B. MAGGS, DISARMAMENT INSPECTION UNDER SOVIET LAW 41-43 (1967).
7. This method of enforcement was suggested in Bohn, supra note 1, at 349.
8. See Galtung, supra note 4, at 123.
9. See Bohn, supra note 1, at 349.
10. L. SztArRD, supra note 2, at 57.
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available to the international authority charged with reviewing citizen
reports."
A secure channel of communication from the people to the international authority to which they are asked to report is critically important
to the plan, and almost everyone who has discussed inspection by the
people has suggested a mechanism to achieve it. Some have suggested
that key individuals, particularly prominent scientists and engineers, be
interrogated by the international authority on a regular basis.' 2 Some
have suggested that telephone offices be maintained throughout the
participating countries so that anonymous communications might be received despite wiretapping.' 3 Professor Szilard proposed that offices be
opened where a reporter could simply walk in with his family, make a
deposition, and be granted asylum.' 4 Professor Galtung called upon his
scientific colleagues to design "a free transistor sender and receiver to
[be placed in] all households, and tuned at the wavelength of the"
international authority. 15 All of these suggestions seem to require a
greater intrusion upon national sovereignty than is necessary or, for
that matter, than is probably acceptable.
Essentially what is required of a communications channel from
national populations to an international authority is that it lend itself
to constant reliability testing. The international postal system seems sufficient for the task. Test letters could be sent from various parts of the
participating countries to the publicly announced address of the international authority. Tampering with or the nondelivery of such mail
would be evidence that violations were occurring and appropriate sanctions could be imposed. 16
Advocates of inspection by the people have generally assumed that
knowledge of significant arms control violations will be available to a
sufficient number of people to insure reporting if the other three factors
are present.'1 The validity of this assumption depends in part upon the
level at which national armaments are maintained under the agreement.
Under an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union
which freezes the number of nuclear delivery systems which each side
can maintain at something over 1,000 on the ground and something over
500 under water, it is extremely unlikely that either side could develop,
manufacture, and deploy a sufficient number of weapons to tip the power

11. S. MELMAN, supra note 1, at 39-40.
12. Bowen, Soviet Research and Development: Some Implications for Arms Control
Inspection, 7 J. CONFLICT RESOLtIMON 426, 447 (1963).

13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Bohn, supra note 1, at 349-50.
L. SzALARD, supra note 2, at 58.
Galtung, supra note 4, at 123.
S. MELMiAN, supra note 1, at 41.
E.g., Bowen, supra note 12, at 442-43.
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balance without many thousands of its citizens being aware of the
scheme. On the other hand, an agreement which sought to eliminate
all nuclear arms might be evaded by a small cabal of scientists and politicians who put together three or four nuclear warheads deliverable in
suitcases.18
Furthermore, although the level of popular sophistication required
will depend upon the nature of the agreement to be negotiated, it is
probably fair to assume that some education of the people will always
be necessary to enable them to recognize violations. It has been urged,
for example, that there are over 80,000 parts in the relatively simple V-2
rocket and that, considering the thousands of people involved, it would be
impossible to exclude all potential reporters from the manufacturing
process. 19 The question now being asked is how many of these people
will be aware of the violation to which they are contributing. The answer
might be particularly small in a "closed" society like that of the Soviet
Union. 20 The solution again seems to lie in the use of the communications media. By advertisements in technical journals and other public
statements, the international authority might elaborate on the kinds of
activity which indicate that violations are occurring: the operation of
certain processes or of certain machines; the production of material to
certain dimensional requirements or to certain strengths and temperature requirements, etc.21
At least two serious problems remain if inspection by the people is to
operate effectively. First, there is the danger that the international
authority could be flooded with false reports which weaken its alertness
and increase its reaction time. Such reports might be made in good faith
by well-meaning but mistaken individuals or deliberately by those seeking to avoid detection of present or future violations. Second, there is
the danger that a flow of ambiguous reports will cause a continuous
series of alarms and international crises. If this were to happen, the
value of the arms control agreement would be greatly reduced; and it

18. For the idea that the type of verification required depends on the level arma-

ments remaining see, for example, A. GoTuE,

DISARMA'MENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAw

132 (1965), Scoville, supra note 3, at 6, and Lall, Perspectives on Inspection for Arms
Control, 21 BULL. OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTIsTs 51, 53 (Mar. 1965).
19. Bowen, supra note 12, at 442-43.
20. [T]here is the emphasis on compartmentalized knowledge. Restrictions on information pervade the entire system. The citizen is not kept informed, as we would
define the term; some information is doled out to him, or he may find things out
for himself; but generally information is made available only on a narrowly interpreted "need to know" basis, with even high officials aware of only a part of the
total picture.

A. H. DEAN, Tsr BAN AND DISARMAMENT: THE PATH
See also, Z. L. ZILE, LEGAL AsPEcTs OF VERIFICATION IN
21. S. MELMAN, supra note 1, at 41.

OF NEGOTIATION 56-57
THE SOVIET UNION 53

(1966).

(1967).
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is doubtful that it would remain in force for very long. The solution
to these problems lies in devising an efficient mechanism through which
the international authority receiving individual reports may determine
their veracity.
Although several advocates of inspection by the people have noted
the existence of these problems,22 none has attempted a solution. It may
be helpful to consider the operating mechanism of existing supranational
institutions which handle communications from individuals. The European Commission on Human Rights, for example, has received over
4,600 applications from individuals or groups of individuals since its
founding in 1953. About 95 percent or about 4,400 of these were declared
inadmissable by the Commission without requiring comments from the
governments complained against; about 150 of the remainder were rejected after obtaining the written or oral observations of the governments
concerned; 39 of the remaining 53 were consolidated as raising the
same issue; and so only about 18 cases were referred to the Committee
of Ministers or the European Court of Human Rights. 23 The Commission employs a three-step procedure. First, it uses internal information
processes to determine whether to accept the petition. If it is accepted,
the accused government is confronted with the evidence against it and
allowed to respond; an inquiry may be held; and attempts are made
to
24
reach a settlement. Finally, if all else fails, sanctions are applied.
The international authority which receives reports of arms control
violations might be able to operate a similarly effective three-step procedure. Reports concerning violations within one nation could be forwarded to the representatives of an adversary power. On the basis of intelligence gathered by "national means" (satellite photography, espionage
activity, etc.), the adversary power could determine whether to proceed
with the report. Hopefully, most reports would be disposed of in this
manner; but if it seemed that there were grounds for serious concern,
the nation charged could be confronted by the report and asked to explain. Documentary evidence might be submitted; and when necessary,
on-site inspection allowed. Finally, if the charged government was un-

22. E.g., Bohn, supra note 1, at 352-53; and Galtung, supra note 4, at 123.
23. PracticalApplication of the European Convention on Human Rights: Some Results Achieved 1953 - 1st September, 1970, Council of Europe Information (Legal),
at 3-4 (1970).
24. For a detailed study of the procedures of the European Commission on Human
Rights and similar supranational institutions see F. L. GRIEVES, SUPRANATIONALISM AND
INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1969); MacBride, The European Court of Human Rights,
3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1970); Wilkoc, Procedures to Deal with Individual
Communications to International Bodies: The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Dis-

crimination and Protection of Minorities, 1 N.Y.UJ.

INT'L

L. & POL. 275 (1968) ; and

Gormley, The Procedural Status of the Individual Before Supranational Judicial

Tribunals, (pts. 1-2), 41 U.

DET.

L. J. 282, 405 (1964).
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able or unwilling to establish that violations had not occurred or to correct a recognized violation, sanctions could be applied.2 5
II. FUNCTIONAL CAPACITY OF PEOPLE'S INSPECTION

Modern weapons development has been conceptually divided into
four stages: research and development ("R and D"), testing, production,
and deployment.26 Conventional verification procedures have emphasized
detection at either the second or fourth stage. Testing can be checked
by seismic and atmospheric analysis at great distances, and atmospheric
tests and deployment are virtually impossible to shield from satellite
reconnaisance. 27 At the same time it has been argued that no conceivable
amount of on-site inspection could possibly investigate all structures capable of housing "R and D" or production facilities, particularly in a
state run economy like that of the Soviet Union.28
Inspection by the people, on the other hand, places a greater emphasis
on detection during "R and D" or production. It may be possible for a
small group of men to conduct tests and deploy advanced systems in
remote and isolated areas; but "R and D" cannot be separated from
sophisticated facilities at key centers with highly skilled work forces;
and production invariably requires the participation of large numbers of
people. 29 Similarly, since inspection by the people makes use of the
varied capacity of human beings rather than the limited capacity of
mechanical instruments, more sophisticated information can be monitored. For example, where conventional verification procedures em-

25. For a discussion of "challenge inspection" by adversaries in a context other than
inspection by the people see Lall, Information in Arms Control Verification, 20 BULL.
OF Tm ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 43 (Oct. 1964). The procedures for control of nuclear
energy used by the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Nuclear Energy
Agency, and the International Atomic Energy Agency indicate that records inspection
together with occasional on-site verification can maintain effective controls. See
Gorove, The Inspection and Control System of the European Nuclear Energy Agencv, 7
VA. J. INT'L L. 68 (1967); Gorove, The First MultinationalAtomic Inspection and Con,trol System at Work: Euratom's Experience, 18 STAN. L. REv. 160 (1965); Willrich,
Safeguarding Atoms for Peace, 60 AM.J. INT'L L. 34 (1966) ; and W. YOUNG, EXISTIC
MECHANISMS OF ARMS CONTROL (1966).
26. Scoville, supra note 3,at 8.
27. Id.
28. Bowen, supra note 12, at 443-44.
29. An interesting consequence of the ability to monitor the comparatively early
phases of "R and D" and production is that the response time for coping with
discovered evasion is increased. This, in turn, both decreases the incentive to cheat and
allows greater flexibility in designing sanctions. See id., at 444-45; Keeton and
Schwarzenberger, The Problem of Sanctions, in H. BULL, THE CONTROL OF THE ARMS
RACE: DISARMAMENT AND ARMuS CONTROL IN THE MISSILE AGE 215, 229 (2d ed. 1965);
and Sohn, Responses to Violations: A General Survey, in SECURITY IN DISARMAMENT 178
(R.Barnet and R. Falk ed. 1965).
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phasize quantity controls, inspection by the people may also be concerned with quality limitations. Inspection by the people, then, is both
reinforcement for and complementary to more conventional verification procedures.
Because of these qualities, inspection by the people has particular
relevance to the problem of arms control caused by scientific and technical innovation. History shows that it is probably impossible to stop
technological advances in weapons from being made. 30 Furthermore,
because of the existing interrelationship between the military and peaceful uses of science, it may be unwise to attempt to halt all efforts at
military research and development. 31 What is desirable is that any arms
control agreement be kept abreast of the latest developments in
weapons. 32 Inspection by the people could call attention to such dewhen negotiations on their control are
velopments in their early stages
33
likely to be most productive.
Perhaps the most significant consequence of inspection by the people
is in the effects it might have in areas other than the detection of violations. Since modern technology has enormously increased the means
by which surveillance can be avoided, it is probably impossible for any
verification system or combination of systems to detect all arms control
violations if the violators have the support and cooperation of a large
number of people. 34 The public relations campaigns which must accompany inspection by the people would undermine this support and
cooperation necessary for evasion. Not only would such efforts make it

30. "Proposals for arms control in recent years have regularly been made irrelevant by
the changing character of weapons." H. BuLL, supra note 29, at 196. See also Bunn,
Missile Limitation by Treaty or Otherwise, 70 COLUm. L. Rxv. 1, 3-4 (1970).
31. This is not meant to suggest that no efforts should be made to impede strictly
military uses of science and technology. Test bans on specific weapon systems, for
example, may sufficiently impede their development to allow sufficient time for development of control mechanisms. What is suggested is that a strictly enforced ban
on all military "R and D" might seriously impede inquiry into areas where military
and nonmilitary applications overlap.
32. See H. BULL, supra note 29, at 195-201.
33. It is patently easier to convince governments not to invest in new weapons
systems than it is to convince them to throw these systems away after billions have
been spent on their production and deployment. For a stimulating discussion of the
problem of surplus systems and their relationship to arms control agreements see
Stone, When and How to Use 'SALT, 48 FOREIGN AYF. 262 (1970Y
34. A valid point in this discussion is that no inspection scheme is likely to succeed
in the face of a unitedly hostile populace, set to deceive the inspectors and to protect
their own government, whether it is cheating or not. Guerrilla warfare teaches a
parallel lesson. Even a small conspiratorial minority cannot be suppressed when the
populace favors them and will hide them in its midst.
Pool, Public Opinion and the Control of Armaments, in ARms CONTROL, DISARMAMENT,
& NATIONAL SWcURITY, supra note 1, at 333, 337. See also S. MELIMAN, supra note 1, at
53, 260-91; and Galtung, supra note 4, at 133-34.
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harder and more risky to cheat because of the greater likelihood of exposure, but they also would create morale problems and confusion within government ranks on what real policy is.3 In short, inspection by the
people would be a rather substantial deterrent to evasion of an arms
control agreement.
III. PROSPECTS

The most persistent criticism of people's inspection is that it would
be politically unacceptable to most existing governments and especially
so to a "closed" society like that of the Soviet Union.3 0 No major power,
it might be argued, is prepared to allow its citizens to determine by themselves when disloyalty is required. Traditional patriotic emphasis on
secrecy and national loyalty may well prevent the adoption of such a plan.
Soviet preoccupation with secrecy and the severe controls that have been
placed on communication between foreigners and Soviet citizens, it is
said, make their opposition to inspection by the people especially predictable.
The rationale behind these policies, however, has been increasingly
7
questioned because of changed circumstances and advancing technology.
Satellite photography and the invulnerability of submarine based missiles
make traditional concern with the details of military secrecy obsolete for
both sides. Indeed, the nature of strategic deterrence being practiced by
both sides today requires that each be somewhat aware of the other's
military capacity. 38
Also, it should be pointed out that the free communication required
for inspection by the people only need be one-way communication, from
the people to the international authority. Each national government
might be given a veto on communications to the people to insure that
they were not being used as a vehicle for any ideology other than arms
control. While governments might still reject such a compromise, per-

35. The main purpose of such a propaganda effort if it is to succeed should, however, not be to sell disarmament to the public, as such, but rather to commit the
propagandizing governments themselves to the scheme for control and to make it
more difficult for them to cheat.
Pool, supra note 34, at 336. See also Szilard, To Stop or Not To Stop, 16 BULL. OF TIlE
ATOMIC SCIENTISTS 82, 84 (1960).

36. E.g., J. E. DOUGHERTY, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT: TIHE CRITICAL Issurs
63 (1966) ; A. DALLIN, THE SovIET UNION AND DISARMAMENT 153-54 (1964).
37. It has been argued that an important reason for Soviet concern with secrecy is
the fear of a first strike by the West. See Bloomfield and Henkin, Inspection and the
Problem of Access, in SECURITY IN DISARMAMENT, supra note 29, at 107, 108-09; and
A. DALLIN, supra note 36, at 142-83.
38. Keeton and Schwarzenberger, supra note 29, at 221-22.
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39
haps the only accurate way to gauge their response is to propose it.
A second objection which has been raised is that fear of retaliation
by one's own government will prevent a sufficient number of people from
40
cooperating with a plan for inspection by the people. Both the United
States and the Soviet Union, for example, have laws which make the
divulgence of information related to national security a crime carrying
severe penalties. 41 Even if these laws were repealed or modified, there is
probably no way to protect a potentially cooperative citizen from the fear
of less formal means of repression or of social ostracism. 42 Similarly, the
difficulty of guaranteeing asylum to reporters has already been discussed. 43 At the same time, the ability of governments to suppress reporters among the public should not be overemphasized. Evidence of
such suppression would indicate a violation of the arms control agreement; and the international authority, in an informal manner, could
44
conduct spot checks to insure against it.
The limited empirical evidence available suggests that there is a
general willingness by people throughout the world to report arms control violations. A 1958 public opinion survey conducted in the United
States, Britain, West Germany, Japan, France, and India found that a
large majority within each nation favored the idea of inspection by the
4
people and said they would be willing personally to participate. 3 A

39. During a question-and-answer period, Mr. Khrushchev was asked by a scientist
whether he would be willing to agree on turning the whole population into an
inspection force, reporting any violation of disarmament to an international agency.
The idea would be that populations of all countries would be educated to detect and
report violations.
"I solemnly assure you on behalf of the Soviet government," Mr. Khrushchev
said, "that I accept all that was set forth by the distinguished scientist here, and
I am ready to undersign such a proposal at any time."
N. Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1960, at 19, col. 6. See also Bohn, supra note 1, at 362.
40. E.g., A. DALLIN, supra note 36, at 230-31 n. 10.
41. Z. L. ZILE, supra note 20, at 301-11 [Soviet laws]; and D. S. ARONowiTz, LEGAL
AsPECrs OF ARNIS CONTROL VERIFICATION IN THE U.S. 164-75 (1965) [U.S. laws].
42. Such restrictions can be particularly effective in a society like that of the Soviet
Union because the Party and the State are so intimately involved in everyday life and
because the Party's internal disciplinary procedures are above the law of the State.
Z. L. ZILE, supra note 20, at 321.
43. See p. 154 supra.
44. See L. SziLARD, supra note 2, at 58.
45. Evans, An InternationalPublic Opinion Poll on Disarmament and "Inspection by
the People": A Study of Attitudes Toward Supernationalism, in S. MEL.,AN, supra note
1, at 231. Although the Evans study was done specifically to test Melman's idea, the
questionnaire seems to have been poorly designed. The question used to gauge willingness to report was as follows:
If you, yourself, knew that someone in (name of country) was attempting to
secretly make forbidden weapons, would you report this to the office of the worldwide inspection organization in this country?
Id. at 233. How many people interpreted "someone" to possibly include their own
government or someone acting with government authority is not clear.
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similar survey conducted in Norway in 1964 found that an overwhelming
percentage of that country favored inspection by the people and were
willing to cooperate personally.46 Furthermore, the former study found
that scientists and engineers, the group most likely to possess informa-

tion of a violation, were more willing to participate than the population
47

as a whole.

Although there is no similar data on Soviet public opinion, there is
no reason to assume

that the Soviet people and particularly Soviet

scientists and engineers would be less favorably disposed toward this

proposal. 48 It has even been argued that the autocratic nature of the Soviet
system is likely to bring forth many more reporters of violations than
would be found in the West. 49 Furthermore, there is a strong tradition of
popular participation in law enforcement which might encourage such
cooperation from within the Soviet Union.5 0
Yet another objection to this plan for inspection by the people might
be that the adversary proceedings suggested to determine the veracity of
reports would be unacceptable to participating governments and unworkable. The forwarding of all reports about one country to an adversary power might involve the disclosure of information concerning
legitimate military operations which are considered secret. Similarly,
allowing an adversary power to be the sole judge of a nation's compliance and allowing it to require on-site inspection as the ultimate

46. Galtung, supra note 4, at 133.
47. Evans, supra note 45, at 242.
48. [S]ome research workers, particularly a certain breed of fundamental scientist,
and regardless of nationality, like to feel that they are essentially pursuing their
own interest (or those of a universal scientific community - the latter also incidentally being a basic Marxist concept> and are somewhat independent of mundane
authority. As a result, such individuals tend to make their own rules of procedure,
save when compelled to comply with someone else's regulations. It would seem,
therefore, that a least a small proportion of the more idealistic (i.e., whether morally
or scientifically so) research workers would constitute weak links in any vast secret
development effort unless they were sufficiently intimidated by fear of possible
punishment or had been chosen for fanatical patriotic or xenophobic tendencies,
the latter qualities usually not being found in association with more creative
mentalities.
Bowen, supra note 12, at 441. See also Szilard, supra note 35, at 84.
49. Pool, supra note 34, at 346; and Bowen, supra note 12, at 441-42.
50. See Z. L. Zira, supra note 20, at 47-48; Ramundo, The Comrade's Court: Molder
and Keeper of Socialist Morality, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 692 (1965); O'Connor, Soviet
People's Guards: An Experiment with Civic Police, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 579 (1964); and
Berman and Spindler, Soviet Comrades' Courts, 38 WASH. L. REv. 842 (1963).
Generally, on the possibility of strengthening the human attributes which would
encourage participation in inspection by the people and which run counter to warlike
behavior see Szalita, Some Comments on PsychologicalAspects of Evasion and Disarmament, in S. MELMAN, supra note 1, at 251 and Rabinowitch, Responsibilities of Scientists in Our Age, 25 BULL. OF THE ATOMrC SciErTrsTS 2, 3-26 (1969).
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verification, it could be argued, builds in a danger of continuous controversy and the likelihood that the agreement will break down.
The changing nature of military secrecy has already been pointed
out.51 In theory, avoiding continuous controversy and the likelihood of
a breakdown in the arms control agreement should not be difficult.
When an agreement is freely entered into by nations, it is logical to assume that they each see the agreement to be in their national interest
52
Each nation would
and that they all desire that it remain in effect.

be concerned not only that others not violate the agreement but also
5
that others be allowed to satisfy themselves that it had not done so. 3
Similarly, the adversary power would desire that the agreement remain
in effect; and, therefore, it would not demand unreasonable proof to
refute a report or attempt to infringe upon the legitimate security interests of the charged nation 54
The problem with this analysis is that international politics does not
regularly fit into such logical patterns. It is entirely conceivable, for
example, that an adversary power might feel that on-site inspection was
essential to refute a particular report while the charged nation was convinced that such inspection could serve no useful purpose other than
espionage. Therefore, if inspection by the people is to further an arms
control agreement rather than create continuous controversy, it is important that no more reliance be placed upon this verification technique
than it can handle. Inspection by the people should at first be used
primarily as an auxiliary to more conventional verification procedures
which would provide primary assurance of compliance. As a working
relationship developed among the parties for handling individual reports and as confidence developed in this procedure, greater reliance
might be placed upon it.
51. See p. 160 supra.
52. See A. GoTLIrEB, supra note 18, at 133; and Lyons, Problems of Compliance Under
Arms Control Agreements, 7 J. CONFLICtLREsOLuTION 351 (1962).
53. See Keeton and Schwarzenberger, supra note 29, at 222.
54. A detailed study of various arms control agreements entered into between 1919
and 1939 concluded as follows:
Careful examination of all factors, regarding the treaties under consideration,
failed to reveal any meaningful relationship between supervision and compliance. It
is true that the evidence submitted above would seem to indicate that an inverse
ratio existed between those treaties utilizing a complex control system and the number of violations detected. That is, treaties employing a sophisticated system of inspection were more often violated than those agreements which left the matter of
compliance to national integrity. The Versailles treaty, consequently, was plagued
with far more violations than the Russo-Finnish pact of the naval agreements. However, the determining factor in this relationship was neither the controls nor compliance but the manner in which the agreement was arranged: if it was imposed,
violations occurred; if it was mutually negotiated, it was relatively free of violations.
4 R. D. BuRNs, DISARMAMENT IN PERSPECTIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF SELECTED ARMs CONTROL
AND DISARMAMENT AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE WORLD WARS, 1919-1939, at 20 (1968).

Cornell InternationalLaw Journal]Vol. 4, No. 2

IV. A PROPOSAL

Because of the secrecy which surrounds the current Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks between the United States and the Soviet Union, it is
impossible to know what is being discussed and what the issues between
the two powers are. It is possible to surmise, however, that the recent
development of Multiple Independently-targeted Reentry Vehicles
(MIRV) must be a topic under serious study. It is in the area of limitations and controls upon MIRV that the verification procedure of inspection by the people may be of immediate use.
MIRV is potentially the most destablilizing element in the nuclear
arsenal yet developed. By increasing the capacity of strategic systems
several fold while the number of launch vehicles remains fixed, MIRV
conjures up the notion of a successful counterforce first strike. At present,
the invulnerability of both United States and Soviet submarine-based
missiles makes the notion of a successful first strike rather farfetched;
yet it is clear that a world where deterrence depends primarily upon the
fact that neither side has yet developed a submarine locating system is
not as safe as a world without MIRV where numerous other calculations
are involved.
The United States recently began deployment of Minuteman III missiles with MIRV warheads and is scheduled to begin deployment of
Poseidon missiles, submarine-launched MIRV, in January, 1971. 55 The
Soviets have begun testing MIRV, but it is estimated that they are
several months from high confidence deployment.5 6 Despite these developments, a complete ban on MIRV testing together with an agreement
banning deployment may yet provide effective controls. A test ban could
be verified by national means, and without further tests the Soviets could
not develop sufficient confidence in their MIRV system for destabilizing
deployment. Continued deployment in the "open" society of the U.S.,
the argument continues, could be detected by examination of Congressional debates, budget requests, procurement contracts, and the public
press. 57 The problem is that neither side seems to have sufficient confidence in its intelligence estimates of the other's capacity or in its
58
capacity to verify such an agreement by "national" means.

55. Wash. Post, Aug. 17, 1970, §A, at 22, col. 3.
56. Scoville, supra note 3, at 9-10.
57. Id. It should also be pointed out that a test ban would prevent further reliability
and increased accuracy test by the U.S., thus further reducing the incentive for deplo)ment.
58. Wash. Post, Sept. 16, 1970, §A, at 14, col. 4. In response to a question on the
possibility of a MIRV test ban agreement, Secretary of State Rogers pointed out this
problem:
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In essence the problem of controlling MIRV is that conventional verification procedures are inappropriate for deployment detection. It is
impossible to tell from satellite photography whether a missile has one
or more warheads. 59 Even with on-site inspection, it is impossible to
determine this from further than a few feet; and neither side is likely
to permit such detailed inspection of its critical weapons. 60 Furthermore,
since warheads might be changed for inspection purposes, it would be
necessary for the on-site inspectors to have complete freedom of movement within the host country to arrange surprise spot checks - again,
a rather remote possibility. 61 Inspection by the people could be directed
toward MIRV deployment, and it might provide the extra assurance to
both sides necessary to induce an agreement.
Inspection by the people of a MIRV ban could operate within the
context of a continuous SALT. The agreement which established this
procedure could be periodically published in the public press of both
nations. A small subcommittee of the SALT could disseminate appropriate propaganda, subject to veto by either nation. The security of
the mails could be verified by each nation planting test mail within the
other. Personnel could be borrowed from the staff of the United Nations
Secretary General to receive and classify incoming mail. Reports received by each nation about the other's activities could be checked against
intelligence gathered from other sources; and, if necessary, they could
be raised as a topic for discussion at a formal SALT session or in an
appropriate subcommittee. The test ban would be the primary assurance of Soviet compliance, and the "openness" of American society
the primary assurance of United States compliance. If inspection by the
people worked in this context it might fundamentally effect future
United States-Soviet negotiations on arms control.

I doubt it very much, because it is very difficult to imagine how it could happen.
We are not sure what stage they are in, and they are not sure what stage we are in;
and if we proposed it too aggressively, they would think that we had completed
our tests to the point where we didn't need any additional tests, and they would be
naturally suspicious.
Interview with Paul Nivon, NET Washington correspondent, aired Nov. 26, 1969, reported in 61 STATE DEPT. BuLu. No. 1591, at 582 (Dec. 22, 1969).
It might also be that the Soviets would not accept any agreement which left the
U.S. in possession of more advanced MIRV technology, but as of now this is not clear.
59. Wash. Post, June 10, 1970, §A, at 11, col. 2.
60. Wash. Post, June 14, 1970, §B (Outlook), at 3, col. 5.
61. For a discussion of the Soviet attitude on the movement of foreigners within its
borders see Z. L. ZiLE, supra note 20, at 123-70.

